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Abstract In spite of broad and positive expectations,
payments for ecosystem services (PES) can bring about
unexpected and negative consequences, especially in terms
of their impacts on the well-being of local communities
dependent on ecosystems. Based on numerous observations
of recurring problems with PES, we put forward an
ecosystem service curse hypothesis (Kronenberg and
Hubacek in Ecol Soc 18:art.10. doi:10.5751/ES-05240-
180110, 2013), that points to counterintuitive negative
development outcomes for countries and regions rich in
ecosystem services. The social and economic problems that
we have been able to depict in many PES schemes reflect
the persistence of maladaptive states in pursuit of sustain-
ability. Instead of providing an opportunity to break out of
poverty, these problems reflect entrapment, which is most
often related to poor quality of institutions. Here we
highlight the linkages between the ecosystem service curse
hypothesis and the dynamic system stability landscapes
discussed in this special issue. Our article consists of three
parts in which we: (1) present the original ecosystem ser-
vice curse hypothesis; (2) link this hypothesis to the
broader discussions relevant to sustainability science; and
(3) highlight the context of traps on which this special
feature focuses.
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Ecosystem service curse
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) are designed to
reward those who maintain ecosystem quality (ecosystem
service providers) through payments from those who ben-
efit from the stream of services generated within that par-
ticular ecosystem (ecosystem service beneficiaries). Those
responsible for providing ecosystem services usually have
a title to use land and manage it in a way that maximizes
the delivery of services demanded by the beneficiaries
(e.g., representing upstream and downstream communities,
respectively). The popularity of this approach has been
growing with an increasing interest in market instruments
for environmental conservation and with the growing
adoption of the ecosystem services framework in envi-
ronmental management.
Although PES are intended to solve environmental
problems and at the same time alleviate poverty, they may
actually aggravate the latter. We refer to such counterin-
tuitive negative socio-economic consequences of PES as
ecosystem service curse (Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013)
and associate them principally with the problems of rent
seeking, unequal bargaining power and volatility of pay-
ments, explained in the following three paragraphs.
Rent seeking may emerge when some actors take over
payments (i.e., rents from ecosystem services), often by
manipulation, corruption or force, from those who would
have been entitled to receive those rents under normal
circumstances. As PES are tied to land ownership, such
problems may emerge when customary property rights are
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not strong enough to ensure that marginal local commu-
nities receive those payments or when these communities
are driven off their land by powerful rent-seeking stake-
holders. For example, such elite capture through the
monopolization of access to forestland has been identified
as one of key challenges to PES implementation in Viet-
nam. In particular, one case study—Ba Vi National Park—
illustrates an extreme situation in which all payments were
captured by local elites who used their connections to
political power and thus monopolized access to land (To
et al. 2012). Furthermore, when the indigenous communi-
ties are forced to move, they often encroach upon other
usually more marginal areas, potentially moving them
beyond a tipping point or otherwise contributing to their
degradation.
Unequal bargaining power, i.e., the fact that ecosystem
service beneficiaries have more experience with market
mechanisms and negotiations, affects the conditions within
which PES transactions are negotiated. Communities
responsible for providing ecosystem services may have
limited experience and understanding of such novel
mechanisms, and few opportunities to seek competent and
affordable legal advice. Some ecosystem service providers
may even be excluded from the potential stream of benefits
because of their inability to enter the relevant negotiations.
Instead, payments may be directed to larger players who
are easier to work with [indeed, for these reasons, the Costa
Rican PES scheme has been critically assessed as an
indirect state subsidy for large agribusiness (Lansing
2013)].
Volatility of payments may make it difficult to create
viable long-term ecosystem management strategies. This
volatility can be due to a number of factors beyond the
control of the recipient. This can include changes to the
respective ecosystems and their properties [often in
response to external biophysical stressors, such as envi-
ronmental degradation, forest fires, and sea level rise
(Friess et al. 2015)], as well as changes in needs and
preferences affecting how much people would be willing or
are able to pay for ecosystem services. These translate into
volatility of income for ecosystem service providers, which
so far has been most evident in payments related to carbon
sequestration due to price fluctuations in the international
carbon market (Phelps et al. 2011).
Rent seeking, unequal bargaining power and volatility
of economic circumstances contribute to the so-called
poverty trap, i.e., the persistence of poverty, in spite of
attempts to get out of it. Persistence of poverty is often
explained by threshold effects (indicating that an individ-
ual, a group or even a country has to reach a certain level of
wealth to be able to get out of poverty), dysfunctional
institutions (that are not able to ensure proper means that
would help people get out of poverty) and neighborhood
effects (influences from one’s peers) (Bowles et al. 2006).
Poverty traps can be linked to multiple barriers that prevent
people from making their own choices and entering mar-
kets on equal terms (Sen 1993). Indeed, many attempts to
provide environmentally sound development opportunities
to poor communities in developing countries have not been
able to break the poverty trap in which those communities
are caught (Valkila 2009). We contend that the potential
ecosystem service curse may represent yet another example
of such problems and that these problems may gain addi-
tional relevance when PES schemes grow as predicted in
the near future (Carroll and Jenkins 2008; Milder et al.
2010).
The ecosystem service curse hypothesis exceeds the
socio-economic focus of most poverty trap discussions to
cover social-ecological systems. Indeed, all of the above
ecosystem service curse problems are related to the
dynamics and complexity in social-ecological systems, and
they ultimately depend on the quality of institutions that
govern these systems. Institutions act as linkages between
the social and the ecological, and require an understanding
that these systems coevolve and mutually influence each
other. Because of these linkages, sustainability science
provides a useful lens to study the ecosystem service curse
hypothesis, notably within the framework of social-eco-
logical traps, as explained in the following sections.
The ecosystem service curse and sustainability
science
PES create new streams of capital, often flowing from more
developed into less developed countries or regions
endowed with valuable ecosystem services. Several prob-
lems have already been observed in the literature with
regard to these payments and the negative effects that they
might have on recipient communities. Many of these
problems resemble those which had been identified within
the case of the so-called resource curse hypothesis. This
hypothesis indicates that resource revenues are highly
correlated with economic problems in poor countries,
which are not able to use those revenues to ensure sound
development (van der Ploeg 2011). Indeed, our ecosystem
services curse hypothesis suggests that once PES increase
in scale they may assert a similarly negative influence in
economies with rich endowments in ecosystem services.
Such an increase in PES might lead to problems such as the
exclusion of local communities from the land that they
have been using or otherwise affecting their ability to
benefit from such payments. Clearly, such problems so far
have only emerged on a local scale and mostly affected
poor ecosystem service providers, thus contradicting the
often highlighted objective of PES, i.e., reducing poverty.
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The above issues are frequently discussed in the context
of sustainability—with regard to poverty and development
disparities, and various challenges related to managing
natural wealth. They refer to governance and to the needs
of various stakeholders, including non-human species and
future generations who are not sufficiently represented in
the debate (Hubacek and Mauerhofer 2008). Indeed, they
reflect interactions between global, social and ecological
systems and the complex mechanisms that lead to their
degradation, which are central to sustainability science.
These issues extend beyond traditional disciplinary
boundaries and require a broader social-ecological systems
perspective—revealing problems associated with uncer-
tainty and ignorance (regarding unintended consequences
of new financial mechanisms), and demonstrate the need
for a precautionary approach.
This is especially evident in the case of global financial
mechanisms for mitigating climate change. Mechanisms
such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD?) and the
afforestation component within the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism already use PES-like schemes on
a global scale. The relevant institutional problems hinder-
ing the social and environmental effectiveness and eco-
nomic efficiency of these programs provide good
illustrations of a potential ecosystem service curse. For
example, REDD? payments, which are meant to reward
practices that counteract deforestation and forest degrada-
tion and in this way prevent carbon emissions, mostly flow
to countries with relatively poor institutions which are not
able to counteract problems such as rent seeking or pay-
ment volatility (Ebeling and Yasue´ 2008; Kronenberg et al.
2015; McAfee 2015).
Similar problems have been observed in the case of
other newly created markets for ecosystem services. These
tend to turn ecosystem services into cash crops (grown for
sale to return a profit) and can lead to the abandonment of
traditional land management and local cultural practices
(e.g., eroding traditional value systems), and exposing
ecosystem-dependent communities to unfavorable power
structures and economic dynamics (Sikor 2013; Pro¨pper
2015; Van Hecken et al. 2015). Among the most notorious
manifestations of these are the so-called land grabs within
which powerful stakeholders exert their high bargaining
power to enforce new land use schemes—to the detriment
of smallholders and especially land users who are not
protected by proper land tenure systems. As part of these
large-scale land acquisitions or long-term leases in poorer
countries land use and land management decisions are
transferred to foreign powerful stakeholders. Indeed, these
have often been associated with exploitation by corrupt or
indebted governments that were not able or willing to
properly regulate these transactions or prevent beneficiaries
from targeting and taking advantage of the poorest rural
communities (Deininger and Byerlee 2011; Cotula 2012).
These problems have also emerged in the case of several
PES projects, including the famous Pimampiro case in
Ecuador which has been found to reinforce existing social
differences and perpetuate inequalities in resource access,
indicating that those with higher bargaining power have
been able to attract most funding (Rodrı´guez de Francisco
et al. 2013),
Ecosystem services and the related financial mecha-
nisms are expected to constitute a proper framework for
addressing the problems that sustainability science deals
with (Clark 2007). However, on an even broader level,
problems depicted within the ecosystem service curse
hypothesis reveal more general complications with the
concept of ecosystem services and the application of eco-
nomic solutions to sustainability challenges. Indeed, eco-
nomic concepts do not neatly fit into sustainability science
(Anderson et al. 2015; Wegner and Pascual 2011) and their
underlying utilitarian and anthropocentric focus trivializes
the complex character of social-ecological systems, thus
broadening the scope of unexpected outcomes. In particu-
lar, introducing economic incentives results in profound
changes within the socio-economic sphere, releasing
human ingenuity to capture these incentives at potential
long-term costs (Kronenberg 2014, 2015).
The ecosystem service curse as a social-ecological
trap
From the perspective of social-ecological systems theory,
the concept of an ecosystem service curse illustrates a
situation where an alteration of social and ecological pro-
cesses leads to livelihood impoverishment and sometimes
even fails to achieve environmental improvement or,
worse, brings about additional environmental degradation.
In this case, the unintended side effects of introducing a
payment reinforce the trap situation (its basin of attraction)
and an initial intervention aimed at improving ecosystem
management produces counterintuitive socio-economic
consequences (Fig. 1).
As suggested by Boonstra and Boer (2014), ‘‘social–
ecological traps are clearly path-dependent processes,
which are causally produced through a conjunction of
events’’—thus traps are dynamic processes rather than
static conditions. Although we focus on poor institutional
setting that is the precondition of an ecosystem service
curse, it is the process of introducing PES and the reaction
of the system that ultimately reinforce the initial trap sit-
uation, which this intervention was meant to solve. Kar-
senty (2007), who referred to a similar problem with PES,
suggested that PES might keep poor communities in a
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poverty trap when they receive payments for refraining
from activities that might negatively affect the ecosystem’s
capacity to provide hitherto unpaid services. Following his
interpretation of the poverty trap, these communities might
become passive ‘‘conservation rentiers’’, losing any dyna-
mism and innovation potential they might have had, had
they pursued their traditional development path or an
alternative one. Our view of a curse emphasizes that
additional factors need to be taken into consideration when
designing PES, such as the likelihood of excluding poor
and ecosystem-dependent communities from ‘‘their land’’
through rent seeking or unfavorable contract formulation
exploiting their low bargaining power.
The ecosystem service curse links to both poverty traps
and rigidity traps, with the former associated with people
‘‘impoverished by circumstances beyond their control’’ and
not realizing the potential for change, and the latter focused
on inflexible institutions and corruption (Carpenter and
Brock 2008). Interestingly, the ecosystem service curse
may be a side effect of excessively emphasizing economic
thinking as a way to solve complex social-ecological
problems (Norgaard 2013). As a result, society keeps being
surprised with unintended and counterproductive conse-
quences of its activities (Faber et al. 1992). In an ecosystem
service curse situation there are not only unintended side
effects further disadvantaging some social agents but there
are also very important interests and winners involved,
which makes reaching the initially intended outcome by the
PES even more difficult. There might be rentiers with large
return on investment achieving even an increase in the
delivery of the focal ecosystem service (but at the above-
mentioned social and potentially also ecological cost—af-
fecting poor communities and other ecosystems). Poor
communities that depend on ecosystems for their liveli-
hoods may either be excluded from using their land or be
subordinated to the needs of external stakeholders
(ecosystem service beneficiaries). In this way they risk not
only losing opportunities to benefit from PES, but also
losing their traditional sources of income. This may result
in additional degradation of ecosystem services that are
deemed less valuable in a given market situation.
Thus, the ecosystem service curse exhibits the inter-
twined problems of complexity and ignorance. Within
sustainability science we need to follow systems thinking,
taking dynamics into account, and acknowledging com-
plexity (Holling 2001; Cilliers 2008). It is not only the
ecological complexity that we need to take into account but
a social-ecological complexity, within which the social
component is also highly variable. Analogous to the ‘‘out
of the frying pan, into the fire’’ trap, when actions intended
to escape a trap accidentally worsen the situation, the
introduction of PES may lead to negative social and eco-
logical consequences. A precautionary approach suggests
that we should consider potential problems already at the
PES design stage (if one is compelled to introduce a PES
scheme), taking into consideration the likelihood of sur-
prises given the messiness of the institutional and social
context as well as the volatility of markets and preferences.
Acknowledgments This research has been funded by the Polish
Ministry of Science and Higher Education (Project No. IP2012
018572).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Anderson M, Teisl M, Noblet C, Klein S (2015) The incompatibility
of benefit–cost analysis with sustainability science. Sustain Sci
10:33–41. doi:10.1007/s11625-014-0266-4
Boonstra WJ, de Boer FW (2014) The historical dynamics of social–
ecological traps. Ambio 43:260–274. doi:10.1007/s13280-013-
0419-1
Bowles S, Durlauf SN, Hoff KR (eds) (2006) Poverty traps. Princeton
University Press, Princeton and New York
Carpenter SR, Brock WA (2008) Adaptive capacity and traps. Ecol
Soc 13:art. 40
Carroll N, Jenkins M (eds) (2008) The matrix: mapping ecosystem
service markets. Forest Trends and Ecosystem Marketplace,
Washington, D.C
Fig. 1 Within an ecosystem
service curse the trap situation is
reinforced and the system is
forced to stay within its basin of
attraction (the x-axis presents
different stability domains)
906 Sustain Sci (2016) 11:903–907
123
Cilliers P (2008) Complexity theory as a general framework for
sustainability science. In: Burns M, Weaver A (eds) Exploring
sustainability science: a Southern African perspective. African
Sun Media, Stellenbosch, pp 39–57
Clark WC (2007) Sustainability science: a room of its own. PNAS
104:1737–1738. doi:10.1073/pnas.0611291104
Cotula L (2012) The international political economy of the global
land rush: a critical appraisal of trends, scale, geography and
drivers. J Peasant Stud 39:649–680. doi:10.1080/03066150.2012.
674940
Deininger KW, Byerlee D (2011) Rising global interest in farmland:
can it yield sustainable and equitable benefits? The World Bank,
Washington D.C
Ebeling J, Yasue´ M (2008) Generating carbon finance through
avoided deforestation and its potential to create climatic,
conservation and human development benefits. Philos Trans R
Soc Lond B Biol Sci 363:1917–1924. doi:10.1098/rstb.2007.
0029
Faber M, Manstetten R, Proops JLR (1992) Humankind and the
environment: an anatomy of surprise and ignorance. Environ
Values 1:217–241
Friess DA, Phelps J, Garmendia E, Go´mez-Baggethun E (2015)
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) in the face of external
biophysical stressors. Glob Environ Change 30:31–42. doi:10.
1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.10.013
Holling CS (2001) Understanding the complexity of economic,
ecological, and social systems. Ecosystems 4:390–405. doi:10.
1007/s10021-001-0101-5
Hubacek K, Mauerhofer V (2008) Future generations: economic,
legal and institutional aspects. Futures 40:413–423. doi:10.1016/
j.futures.2007.10.001
Karsenty A (2007) Questioning rent for development swaps: new
market-based instruments for biodiversity acquisition and the
land-use issue in tropical countries. Int For Rev 9:503–513.
doi:10.1505/ifor.9.1.503
Kronenberg J (2014) What can the current debate on ecosystem
services learn from the past? Lessons from economic ornithology.
Geoforum 55:164–177. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2014.06.011
Kronenberg J (2015) Betting against human ingenuity: the perils of
the economic valuation of nature’s services. Bioscience
65:1096–1099. doi:10.1093/biosci/biv135
Kronenberg J, Hubacek K (2013) Could payments for ecosystem
services create an ‘‘ecosystem service curse’’? Ecol Soc
18:art.10. doi:10.5751/ES-05240-180110
Kronenberg J, Orligo´ra-Sankowska E, Czembrowski P (2015) REDD?
and institutions. Sustainability 7:10250–10263. doi:10.3390/
su70810250
Lansing DM (2013) Understanding linkages between ecosystem
service payments, forest plantations, and export agriculture.
Geoforum 47:103–112. doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2013.03.009
McAfee K (2015) The post- and future politics of green economy and
REDD?. In: Stephan B, Lane R (eds) The politics of carbon
markets. Routledge, London and New York, pp 237–260
Milder JC, Scherr SJ, Bracer C (2010) Trends and future potential of
payment for ecosystem services to alleviate rural poverty in
developing countries. Ecol Soc 15:art.4
Norgaard RB (2013) Escaping Economism, Escaping the Econocene.
In: Schneidewind U, Santarius T, Humburg A (eds) Economy of
sufficiency. Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and
Energy, Wuppertal, pp 44–52
Phelps J, Webb EL, Koh LP (2011) Risky business: an uncertain
future for biodiversity conservation finance through REDD?.
Conserv Lett 4:88–94. doi:10.1111/j.1755-263X.2010.00155.x
Pro¨pper M (2015) Emerging markets for nature and challenges for the
ecosystem service approach. Dev Change 46:247–268. doi:10.
1111/dech.12153
Rodrı´guez de Francisco JC, Budds J, Boelens R (2013) Payment for
environmental services and unequal resource control in Pimam-
piro, Ecuador. Soc Nat Resour 26:1217–1233. doi:10.1080/
08941920.2013.825037
Sen A (1993) Capability and well-being. In: Nussbaum M, Sen A
(eds) The quality of life. Clarendon, Oxford, pp 30–53
Sikor T (ed) (2013) The justices and injustices of ecosystems services.
Routledge, London and New York
To PX, Dressler WH, Mahanty S et al (2012) The prospects for
payment for ecosystem services (PES) in Vietnam: a look at
three payment schemes. Hum Ecol 40:237–249. doi:10.1007/
s10745-012-9480-9
Valkila J (2009) Fair Trade organic coffee production in Nicaragua—
sustainable development or a poverty trap? Ecol Econ
68:3018–3025. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.07.002
van der Ploeg F (2011) Natural resources: curse or blessing?
J Economic Lit 49:366–420. doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.366
Van Hecken G, Bastiaensen J, Windey C (2015) Towards a power-
sensitive and socially-informed analysis of payments for ecosys-
tem services (PES): addressing the gaps in the current debate.
Ecol Econ 120:117–125. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2015.10.012
Wegner G, Pascual U (2011) Cost-benefit analysis in the context of
ecosystem services for human well-being: a multidisciplinary
critique. Glob Environ Change 21:492–504. doi:10.1016/j.
gloenvcha.2010.12.008
Sustain Sci (2016) 11:903–907 907
123
